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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

I

GALE LEE BOONE,
\
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

(

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah )
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent. ,

Case No.
12705

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Gale Lee Boone, appeals from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court denying his
release from the Utah State Prison upon a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On September 5, 1971, Gale Lee Boone filed a complaint and petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging
that his commitment to the Utah State Prison was invalid. The matter came on for hearing on October 21,
1971, before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., who
denied the petition on October 28, 1971.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the denial for a
writ of habeas corpus rendered in the court below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent makes a general stipulation to the fact.5
set forth in appellant's brief with the exception that respondent denies appellant's assertion that he failed t;o
consult his attorney before entering his guilty plea.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA DEMAND
THE CONCLUSION THAT SAID PLEA WAS
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY
ENTERED.
Appellant contends that he had not discussed his
constitutional rights with his attorney prior to his plea
of guilty; that the court failed to advise him of his con·
stitutional rights before accepting his plea; and that he
entered a guilty plea without knowledge of the conse·
quences of said plea. Hence, appellant urges that his plea
of guilty was involuntarily and unintelligently given and
should be rendered invalid under Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 274 (1969).
The relevant portion of appellant's transcript is set
forth below:
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THE COURT: You have heard the infonnation read, Mr. Boone. Do you want to enter a plea
at this time or await the statutory time within
which to plead?
THE DEFENDANT: Plead now.
THE COURT: And waive the statutory time?
ly).

THE DEFENDANT:

(Nodded affirmative-

THE COURT: Let the record show that he
nodded yes. And what is your plea Mr. Boone?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
THE COURT: Let the record show that the
defendant has entered a plea of guilty. Now, Mr.
Boone, have you been informed as to the consequences of entering a plea of guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that burglary carries a term in the Utah State Prison?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And knowing that, and knowing that you may go there do you still desire to
enter a plea of guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: 0. K. Let the record so show.
MR. MITCHELL: The defendant has informed me that he wants it done immediately,
your Honor.
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ord?

THE COURT: Have you got a previous recTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: A serious record?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, in this connection his only record is as a juvenile.
MR. LEARY: If the Court please, I took a
hasty look at the record, and as I recall, it was a
robbery charge. I don't recall how that was handled, but it seems to me it was through the district
court. He was confined at the Industrial School.
fore:

THE COURT: You were here before me be-

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I was on probation. I was committed to the State Industrial
School for three years and put on probation.
MR. LEARY: It was on a robbery charge.
THE COURT: That was my recollection. Is
there any point in referring this to the Adult Probation and Parole?
MR. MITCHELL: None, your Honor.
THE COURT: The judgment and sentence
of this Court, Mr. Gale Lee Boone, is that you be
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the inde·
terminate term provided by law and a commitment will issue forthwith (R. 2-4).
Neither the Transcript of appellant's arraignment
nor appellant's brief supply facts which might tend ro
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support any assertion that the 1960 guilty plea was involuntary, i.e., entered as a result of inducement, coercion, or duress. Absent a showing of such facts, appellant's guilty plea must be deemed acceptable unless it
can be shown that appellant was not advised of the consequences of such plea, since a plea of guilty must involve
a knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.
Boykin, supra, involved an appeal from a conviction
for armed robbery based upon appellant's plea of guilty
in a state court. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that an acceptable guilty plea may not be presumed
unless it is affirmatively shown by the record to have
been entered voluntarily and intelligently and that a
record silent on the issue constitutes reversible error.
State cases reviewing Boykin, however, have been willing
to give it prospective application only. See Miller v. Rhay,
1 Wash. App. 1010, 466 P. 2d 179 (1970); In re Tahl, 81
Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P. 2d 499 (1969); State v. Griswold,
105 Ariz. 1, 457 P. 2d 331 (1969). Inasmuch as appellant's plea was entered in 1960, 9 years prior to Boykin,
supra, it will be necessary to adjudge the acceptability of
his plea in light of pre-Boykin standards.
Intelligent waiver requirements similar to those
found in Boykin, supra, are also found in cases prior to
1969 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487 (1962),
is representative of the then-existing law. That case involved a plea of guilty to bank robbery charges. In holding the plea to represent a valid waiver of important con-
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stitutional rights, Justice Stewart, speaking for the major.
ity, declared that courts should be careful not to accept
guilty pleas unless they are made voluntarily after proper
advice and with full understanding of the consequences.
See also Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223
(1927). However, neither that court nor any other court
up until the decision in Boy hin, supra, ever demanded
that the record affirmatively show the fulfillment of those
requirements. The crucial inquiry, then, is to detennine
what constitutes a valid guilty plea where the record does
not affirmatively show that the accused was advised of
the consequences of such a plea.
In State v. Banford, 13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P. 2d 473
( 1962) , the court below had accepted a guilty plea from
a minor who was not represented by counsel without ad·
vising him of the consequences of his plea. In rendering
the plea invalid, the court unanimously held that where
a defendant is not represented by counsel, the court
should not accept a plea of guilty until it has explained
to the defendant the consequences of such plea, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-6 (1953). However, neither
statute nor case can be found in Utah setting forth the
procedure to be adopted by the court where the defen·
dant, as in the instant case, is represented by counsel.
In the absence of such authority, decisions in close-lying
jurisdiction may be helpful.

In re Tahl, supra, involved a guilty plea by the ac·
cused to counts of murder, grand theft, and rape. In
that case, as in the instant case, the lower court failed
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to advise the accused of the consequences of his guilty
plea before accepting it. The California Supreme Court
cited numerous cases relative to the problem and concluded that a review of California law indicated that the
crucial factor in the acceptability of a guilty plea is the
presence of counsel:
"If an accused has counsel, courts have generally assumed, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, [that] counsel will perform his duty as
an advocate and an officer of the court to inform
the accused of and take steps to protect rights
afforded him by law.

"The California rule has been stated as follows: 'The court must inform the defendant of
his right to counsel, but need not inform him of
the consequences of his plea; that is, the responsibility of his counsel, not the court.' (Citation
omitted.)" (Emphasis added.) 81 Cal. Rptr. at
582.

Thus, where counsel is present the court will assume the
accused has been properly advised of his rights. A guilty
plea under such circumstances will be deemed acceptable
under due process requirements. In the instant case, it
is apparent that appellant was represented by counsel
both before and at the time the guilty plea was entered.
In addition, courts have traditionally evaluated defendant's understanding of the consequences of a guilty
plea from other circumstances such as age, prior record,
length of time between arrest and arraignment, and other
factors implying familiarity with the criminal procedure.
As the transcript of appellant's arraignment discloses,
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petitioner had been before the same judge on a previous
occasion. Two weeks had elapsed between the time of
arrest and the time of the arraignment, and petitioner
had conversed with his attorney in regards to the guilty
plea prior to arraignment (R. 35). Further, it appears
that the court specifically inquired of appellant whether
he understood the consequences of his plea, to which
appellant answered in the affirmative. The court also
made it very clear to petitioner that a term at the state
prison would be a consequence of a plea of guilty. All
of these factors support a conclusion that appellant knowingly and understandingly entered his plea of guilty.
It is also of significance that the trial court, Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding, denied appellant's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus which denial included
a finding that appellant's plea of guilty was intelligently
entered (R. 17) . The court in Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah
2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968 (1968), facing a situation similar to
the instant appeal, ruled as follows:

"[I]t should also be kept in mind that the
questions as to whether he [the accused] was ...
properly advised as to the consequences of his
plea of guilty are primarily questions of fact. The
trial court having heard evidence relating thereto
and having found the issue against plaintiff, it is
our . . . duty to indulge the usual credit due his
findings and judgment." Id. at 99.
Absent a showing of abuse of discretion at the lower court
level, it is submitted that this court affirm the denial of
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds
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that appellant's plea of guilty was intelligently and voluntarily entered.

POINT II.
APPELLANT'S PAROLE REV 0 CAT I 0 N
HEARING WAS CONDUCTED IN CONFORMITY WITH DUE PROCESS' REQUIREMENTS AND REPRESENTS A
VALID EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETIONARY A UT H 0 R I TY CONFERRED UPON
THE BOARD OF PARDONS.
Appellant contends that minimal due process requirements demand that a parolee be given the right to have
witnesses testify in his behalf at a parole revocation hearing. Appellant's claim is frivolous and without merit.
Appellant bases his argument for a right to witnesses
at a parole revocation hearing on the assumption that his
''liberty" is at stake. The court in Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah
2d 418, 454 P. 2d 624 (1969), indicates why the assumption is erroneous. That case involved a parole revocation
hearing also, during which the defendant pled to numerous parole violation charges without an attorney. The
ultimate holding that the parolee was not entitled to
counsel at a parole revocation hearing was the product
of the court's analysis of the status of a parolee.
"When the defendant has been tried and convicted and sentenced, and no appeal or other proceedings are pending to test the propriety of the
guilty verdict, then the critical stages of the pro-
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ceedings are over, and the defendant has no con.
stitutional rights to be placed on . . . parole. His
being placed on . . . parole is merely a matter of
grace given because of confidence reposed in his
promises to refrain from criminal acts and t.o be
a useful law-abiding citizen. When a ... parolee
violates the confidence reposed in him, he ought
not to be heard to cry when he is simply given
the just desserts to which he was originally entitled." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 421.
A parolee is a prisoner outside prison walls, whose
"liberty", as spoken of in the Fourteenth Amendment,
has already been taken away by judicial fiat. Any ''liberty" enjoyed by the prisoner thereafter and during the
term of his sentence is less than that contemplated by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and can be taken away without the usual Fourteenth Amendment restrictions.
Appellant makes no claim that his conviction on the
charge of resisting an officer did not violate a provision
of his parole agreement. Nor does appellant contend
that the Board of Pardons lacked authority to revoke his
parole upon such grounds. The substance of appellant's
argument is that the recent Supreme Court decision in
Morrissey v. Brewer, ...... U. S. ______, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92
S. Ct. ______ (June 29, 1972), is evidence for the proposition
that a parolee shall be allowed to present witnesses in his
behalf at a parole revocation hearing. Nevertheless, as
appellant himself concedes, that decision is to have application only to future revocation proceedings. The law
under which appellant's revocation hearing must be eval·
uated is correctly stated in A.lverez v. Turner, 422 F. 2d
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214 (10th Cir. 1970). The court in that case set forth
the requirements that due process demanded of a parole
revocation hearing:

"[W]e affirm our holding in Gonzales v. Patterson, 370 F. 2d 94, that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment does not generate
rights to confrontation nor to cross-examination or
compulsory process (citation omitted) . We also
hold that due process does not comprehend the
dual rights to witnesses under oath and evidence in conditional release hearings." (Emphasis
added.) 370 F. 2d 214.
The Board of Pardons, pursuant to the discretionary
authority conferred upon it under Utah Code Ann. §§
77-62-16 and 77-62-17 (1953) determined that appellant's
violation of a state penal law (resisting a police officer,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-58-54 (1953)) was sufficient to require a parole revocation. Appellant cannot be heard to
attack that decision.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant's plea
of guilty was given intelligently and voluntarily, and that
the parole revocation hearing was constitutionally expedited, respondent respectfully submits that the judgment
and order of the court below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

